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Recent legislation in France, which authorized
the separation of the financial operations of the
Exchange Stabilization Fund from the French
Treasury and their return to the Bank of France,
has renewed interest in the functions and practices
of stabilization funds. This note is concerned with
the origin of such institutions, the history of the
French Fund, and the significance of the recent
change in France.
Exchange stabilization funds first came into ex-
istence during the thirties when the international
gold standard became disrupted. In the midst of
world-wide depression, many countries sought to
combat declining income and employment with
domestic fiscal and monetary policies which were
intended to increase economic activity while mini-
mizing contractive influences from abroad.
Systems of flexible exchange rates were widely
adopted in the attempt to adjust to external develop-
ments without undesired changes in domestic price
levels or economic activity. At the same time, many
countries established exchange stabilization funds
to regulate exchange rates which no longer had
fixed gold parities. These institutions were expected
to buy and sell foreign currencies and thus to in-
fluence the demand-supply relationship in foreign
exchange markets; in this way they attempted to
maintain exchange rates at the levels desired by
the monetary authorities. While this function could
have been performed directly by central banks, it
was deemed important to establish separate institu-
tions in order to maintain the secrecy of stabiliza-
tion operations and to isolate the losses resulting
from such operations.
Thus in most countries the stabilization fund
was organized as a separate department of the cen-
tral bank to be operated by it for the account of
the treasury. This made it possible to separate the
accounts of the stabilization fund from those of the
central bank and to withhold them from regular
publication. By maintaining such secrecy it was
hoped to minimize speculative movements of short-
term capital which might result from, as well as in-
duce, fluctuations in exchange rates. Moreover, the
establishment of stabilization funds protected the
central bank from the risk of losses on exchange
operations in fluctuating currencies. Such losses
(or profits) were usually charged to the treasury.
In some countries, notably the United Kingdom,
stabilization funds had the additional function of
attempting to insulate the domestic money market
from the effects of inflows and outflows of short-
term capital which, in turn, frequently required in-
ternational transfers of gold. Because international
movements of short-term capital in the thirties were
erratic and volatile, an attempt was made to prevent
them from affecting the credit base; for this pur-
pose the British stabilization fund sold Treasury
securities and absorbed bank reserves when capital
was flowing in and bought Treasury securities when
capital flowed out. It may be noted that this func-
tion of some stabilization funds was contrary to
earlier practice under the gold standard. Then cen-
tral banks had been expected not only to refrain
from neutralizing the internal monetary effects of
changes in gold reserves but to reinforce the effects
of such changes by suitable modifications in redis-
count rates and consequent changes in central bank
holdings of domestic assets. In this way inflows
and outflows of gold, whether in response to trade
or capital movements, sharply affected the credit
base.
THE FRENCH FUND BEFORE THE WAR
After the French franc was stabilized in 1926,
French gold reserves increased tremendously as a
result of substantial inflows of capital and a favor-
able trade balance. To a large extent the capital
inflow consisted of French funds that were being
repatriated as the owners regained confidence in
the franc. Gold reserves continued to increase
even after the advent of the depression in 1929,
partly because funds were being withdrawn from
the United Kingdom and other countries.
When Britain left the gold standard in 1931 and
devalued the pound sterling, the French monetary
authorities determined to maintain the gold parity
of the franc, which at that time was among the
strongest currencies in Europe. Since world prices
were falling and many other countries had de-
valued their currencies, the French monetary au-
thorities, in order to preserve the competitive posi-
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tion of French exports, advocated and attempted
to apply deflationary policies which would accelerate
the decline in French prices. These policies in-
cluded, on the one hand, monetary measures de-
signed to discourage bank lending and, on the
other, efforts to reduce wages and salaries and to
cut the budget deficit by curtailing Government
expenditure.
France was not the only country to adopt such
a course of action after 1931. The so-called gold
bloc also included Belgium and Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy. As the feel-
ing grew that the exchange rates of these countries
could not be maintained, they all suffered irregular
losses of capital and appeared also to encounter a
greater setback in exports than was the case in coun-
tries which had depreciated.
This situation became worse for France after
the devaluation of the dollar in 1933-34 and the
Belgian devaluation in April 1935. The growing
outflow of capital, together with deficits on current
account, exerted steady pressure on the franc and
produced a substantial and almost continuous loss
of gold. Further efforts were made to enforce the
restrictive monetary policy and to reduce the budget
deficit in an attempt to restore confidence in the
currency. Not only did these efforts fail to deter
Frenchmen from sending their capital abroad, but
they also tended to depress further the level of
economic activity. Moreover, France was not in
a position consistently to pursue policies that would
combat the fall in incomes and employment, since
such action would have required greater monetary
ease and increased budget deficits. Although stop-
gap measures to combat distress were taken in
various fields, particularly agriculture, the inability
to adopt such measures on a broader scale con-
tributed to the development of social unrest and
economic conflict as unemployment increased and
living standards were depressed.
Finally, a newly elected Government committed
to internal expansion unpegged the franc in Sep-
tember 1936 and allowed it to depreciate by 30
per cent. The Exchange Stabilization Fund was
established and endowed with assets consisting of
10 billion francs (496 million dollars) in gold,
which came from the gold reserve of the Bank of
France. At the same time the Tripartite Agree-
ment was concluded by the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France, pledging the three
countries against competitive devaluation.
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The Exchange Stabilization Fund was directed
to regulate the relationship of the franc to foreign
currencies within the limits fixed by the law au-
thorizing devaluation. One of the main functions
of the Fund was to cooperate with similar Ameri-
can and British institutions to prevent wide fluctua-
tions in exchange rates. Under a protocol to the
Tripartite Agreement, the three countries agreed
that the stabilization fund of each country could
purchase the currencies of the other two in order to
prevent its currency from appreciating, with the
assurance that the foreign exchange so acquired
could be converted into gold within 24 hours.
The Tripartite Agreement, to which Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Switzerland later adhered,
was regarded as an attempt to maintain, through
international cooperation, some of the advantages
of the gold standard while permitting the countries
freedom of action in domestic policies. The vague
wording of the Agreement did not establish any
precise commitments by the signatories as to the
maintenance of fixed exchange rates, yet they agreed
to "use appropriate available resources so as to
avoid as far as possible any disturbance of the basis
of international exchange" which emerged from
the French devaluation.
It had been expected that the French Exchange
Stabilization Fund would maintain the value of the
franc in terms of gold and foreign currencies by
both purchases and sales in the market. As it
turned out, however, the return flow of capital
which had been anticipated by the French authori-
ties did not materialize and, as a result, the Fund's
operations consisted mainly of sales of gold and
foreign exchange. The growing danger of war, the
economic and social policies of the Popular Front
Government, and expectations of further devalua-
tion caused the capital flight to persist and to in-
crease in magnitude, notwithstanding numerous
inducements to repatriate capital and repeated as-
surances that the franc would not be devalued
further.
During the first six months of the Fund's ex-
istence, the French franc was maintained at a
fixed rate of exchange. While the devaluation law
only required that the value of the franc be main-
tained within the limits of 43 and 49 milligrams
of gold (22.96 and 20.15 francs per U. S. dollar),
the Fund undertook during this period to stabilize
the rate half-way between the legal limits. The
Fund sold gold abroad to acquire foreign curren-
FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN
Federal Reserve Bulletin: January 1950THE FRENCH EXCHANGE STABILIZATION FUND
cies, mainly dollars and sterling, which it then
sold on the foreign exchange market in France
when the private demand for foreign exchange was
greater than the supply at the rate of exchange the
Fund was maintaining. When the Fund's gold
resources were exhausted it became necessary to
purchase more gold from the Bank of France if
the Fund were to continue its operations. Thus,
during this period the Fund acted as an inter-
mediary through which the Bank of France sold
gold abroad in an effort to maintain the exchange
rate. In effect, France was still on the gold stand-
ard.
Furthermore, since the franc assets acquired by
the Fund when it sold foreign exchange to the
public were maintained on idle deposit at the Bank
of France, the internal monetary effects of capital
and current account transactions were also similar
to those that would have occurred under the gold
standard. That is, an outflow of capital led to a
transfer of reserves and notes from commercial
banks and the public to the Fund and thus, other
influences aside, tended to produce monetary strin-
gency. In contrast to the French practice, the
British Exchange Equalization Account invested
the sterling proceeds of its sales of foreign exchange
in Treasury securities, which it purchased in the
open market. As a result, bank reserves were not
reduced when capital flowed out of the United
Kingdom.
Behind this difference in practice there were
important differences in economic conditions in the
two countries. Whereas the United Kingdom ex-
perienced a sustained recovery after 1932, the "re-
flationary" policy of the French Popular Front Gov-
ernment did not succeed in decisively lifting the
French economy from its prolonged stagnation.
The measures taken in the field of social and wage
policy, while reducing unemployment by cutting
the work week, resulted to a greater extent in in-
creased wages and prices than in higher levels of
production. As French costs and prices rose rela-
tive to those in other countries, the balance-of-
payments deficit increased. Anticipation that fur-
ther devaluation would be necessitated by these
developments, and reactions to the social policies
of the Popular Front Government, tended to main-
tain the outward flow of French capital. Under
these conditions a policy of offsetting the internal
monetary effects of outflows of gold, as was done in
Britain, might have served simply to provide fur-
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ther funds to those who were converting francs
into foreign currencies.
Beginning in March 1937, the French Fund
abandoned the goal of maintaining a fixed rate
for the franc and announced that the exchange
rate would be permitted to fluctuate between the
legal limits. The rate immediately fell to nearly
the lower limit, at which point the Fund was re-
quired to support it. The support operations again
depleted the gold holdings of the Fund and re-
quired it to purchase more gold from the Bank
of France.
By a decree of June 30, 1937, the franc was com-
pletely divorced from gold and was permitted to
depreciate further by almost 14 per cent to about
26 francs per dollar. The obligation to maintain
the value of the franc between fixed limits was
suspended, and henceforth intervention in the for-
eign exchange markets to determine the relation-
ship between the franc and foreign currencies was
left to the discretion of the Exchange Stabilization
Fund.
After a short period of capital repatriation in
late 1937, the direction of flow was reversed again
and the franc was permitted to decline to about
32 francs per dollar by the end of April 1938. In
May a new Government, which had taken office
in April, decided to depreciate the franc to the
rate of 36 francs per dollar where, except for moder-
ate fluctuations, it was held until the outbreak of
the war.
At the same time the regulations concerning the
Stabilization Fund were changed in an effort to
prevent the recurrence of an experience in the fall
of 1937. During this period of capital repatriation,
the Fund had found it necessary to sell gold to
the Bank of France in order to procure the neces-
sary francs to purchase the inflow of foreign ex-
change. When capital flowed out again, the Fund
repurchased gold from the Bank. Since these
transactions were reflected in the gold holdings
shown in the Bank's weekly balance sheet, the
adverse movement became public knowledge and
tended to encourage further capital flight. In order
to avoid this problem in the future, a law was
passed which authorized the Fund to borrow francs
from the Treasury and also to sell gold to the Fonds
de Soutien des Rentes, a Government agency
charged with the responsibility of supporting the
prices of Government securities.
From the end of 1938 until the establishment of
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exchange control upon the outbreak of hostilities in
September 1939, a considerable inflow of capital
occurred and the Fund was able to sell gold to the
Bank of France. Nevertheless, three years after
the creation of the Exchange Stabilization Fund
the franc had depreciated by almost 60 per cent
in relation to the dollar, and the gold reserve of the
Bank of France had declined by over 600 million
dollars.
THE FUND SINCE THE WAR
In February 1940 the financial operations of the
Exchange Stabilization Fund were separated from
the Bank of France and transferred to the Treas-
ury. This important change, which became sig-
nificant during the postwar period, permitted the
Fund to invest its franc assets in Treasury bills (and
later merely to deposit them with the Treasury)
instead of depositing them at the Bank of France.
This meant that when France incurred balance-of-
payments deficits and the Fund sold more foreign
exchange to importers than it bought from export-
ers, additional francs became available to the Treas-
ury to finance its expenditures.
The inflationary conditions which prevailed in
France from the end of the war until recently lim-
ited the Treasury's ability to borrow from the pub-
lic and the banks. There were also legal and psy-
chological limits on Treasury borrowing from the
Bank of France. Under these circumstances the
Treasury's financial requirements continuously
pressed against its resources and any increases
in funds available to the Treasury were likely to
result in additional Government expenditures.
During the entire postwar period the franc coun-
terpart of both foreign aid and the liquidation
of official gold and foreign exchange has been an
important source of financing for the Treasury.
Even since the advent of the European Recovery
Program, a significant portion of public invest-
ment expenditures has been financed by releases,
approved by the Economic Cooperation Adminis-
tration, from the counterpart fund, into which
the Government is required to deposit the franc
proceeds of aid furnished on a grant basis. Thus an
increase in the balance-of-payments deficit, whether
financed by foreign aid or by sales of official gold
and foreign exchange by the Exchange Stabiliza-
tion Fund, has tended to permit a higher level of
Government expenditures. Consequently, the de-
flationary influence of the increased balance-of-
payments deficit has tended to be offset.
On the other hand, a balance-of-payments surplus
would require the Exchange Stabilization Fund
to purchase more foreign exchange than it sells.
During the spring of 1949, although France still
had an over-all deficit, its balance-of-payments posi-
tion with a number of European countries and
with the sterling area began to improve consider-
ably as a result of the internal stabilization achieved
toward the end of 1948.
1 Since the franc counter-
part of the dollar deficit, which was financed by
EGA, was required to be deposited in a special
account, the Fund found it necessary to call on
the Treasury for the francs with which to purchase
the other foreign currencies it had begun to ac-
cumulate. In addition, foreign central banks hold-
ing French Treasury bills began to liquidate them
in order to provide the francs needed in their
countries to purchase increased amounts of French
exports. The result was a drain on the Treasury's
limited resources which began to interfere w
rith
the financing of its budgetary commitments.
This development was perhaps the principal im-
mediate motivation for the legislation in July 1949
which provided that the financing of the Stabili-
zation Fund be removed from the Treasury and
returned to the Bank of France. The Stabilization
Fund now borrows francs without interest from
the Bank of France and maintains its franc assets
on deposit at the Bank of France. The Fund is
also empowered to sell gold and foreign exchange
to the Bank and buy gold and foreign exchange
from the Bank if necessary.
The Exchange Stabilization Fund has the same
relationship to the Bank of France now as it had
in the thirties, except that it has the additional
authority to borrow from the Bank. Changes in
France's international payments position, under the
present arrangement, will influence the domestic
monetary system in the traditional manner. That
is, an accumulation of foreign exchange, represent-
ing an improved balance of payments, will increase
the credit base of the banking system since it will
be financed by payments of francs from the Bank
of France to the private economy; on the other
hand, a decline in foreign exchange reserves will
reduce commercial bank reserves as francs accumu-
late in the Fund's account at the Bank of France.
It is significant that this change in organization
1See Federal Reserve BULLETIN, April 1949, pp. 348-60.
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frees the French Treasury from a restraint that was
being imposed by the recent improvement in the
balance of payments. Thus, a major purpose for
undertaking exchange rate adjustments in the
thirties—to permit greater flexibility for domestic
economic policies—is again relevant in the recent
transfer of the Fund's financial ties from the Treas-
ury to the Bank of France.
From 1945 through 1948 the link between the
Stabilization Fund and the Treasury provided a
mechanism whereby the deflationary effect of large
balance-of-payments deficits were counteracted. In
1949, on the other hand, an improving balance of
payments tended to generate a contractive influence
on the domestic economy precisely because of this
link between the Stabilization Fund and the Treas-
ury. Once again, as in the thirties, France has
attempted to avoid tendencies toward domestic
contraction which derived from a more or less auto-
matic relationship.
Under the present relationship of the Exchange
Stabilization Fund to the Bank of France, changes
in gold and foreign exchange reserves will tend to
have the traditional automatic effect on the reserves
of the banking system as is the case in the United
States. Under conditions of domestic economic
stability, the Bank of France can adapt its monetary
policies to these changes in the light of develop-
ments in the economy as a whole.
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